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Drawing on work by philosophers CAJ Coady 
and David Coady on the epistemology of 
rumours, I develop a theory which exploits the 
distinction between rumouring and rumour-
mongering for the purpose of explaining why we 
should treat rumours as a species of justified 
belief. 
Whilst it is true that rumour-mongering, the 
act of passing on a rumour maliciously, presents a 
pathology of the normally reliable transmission of 
rumours, I will argue that rumours themselves 
have a generally reliable transmission process, 
that of rumouring, and should be considered to be 
examples of warranted beliefs. 
My argument will also touch on the 
association of rumours with another class of 
beliefs that are usually considered to be suspect, 
conspiracy theories. I will argue that whilst 
rumours are reliable (as a mechanism for the 
transmission of justified beliefs) the analysis of 
the transmission of conspiracy theories requires 
us to realise they are different to rumours in some 
important respects.  
                                                            
2I should like to acknowledge the feedback I received on this paper 
from Drs. Jonathan McKeown-Green and Justine Kingsbury, as well as 
a third person who does not want to be named. This unnamed person, 
along with Giovanni Tiso, Nathan Grange and Paul Litterick were also 
instrumental in stripping out most (hopefully) of the many spelling 
errors and grammatical mistakes that where introduced when I turned a 
chapter of my PhD dissertation into the paper you are reading today. 
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1  Introduction 
Rumours are often considered to be examples of unwarranted beliefs: 
the spreading of rumours is often considered to be a pathological form 
of the otherwise reliable transmission process we normally associate 
with testimony. I wish to argue that the transmission process of 
rumours is, contrary to what most people thing, reliable. However, to 
do this requires that I distinguish between the act of rumouring and the 
problematic act of rumour-mongering, which is an unreliable and 
malicious transmission process. I will then compare and contrast 
rumours with conspiracy theories, which are sometimes thought to 
suffer from similar flaws. 
I shall define a rumour as being: 
 An unverified proposition which has been heard by an agent 
and then expressed to another agent.  
a definition which I take it is in line with how we commonly define a 
rumour. 
I think it is crucial to any definition of a rumour that the hearer 
must have a belief that the rumour they are considering, which has been 
uttered by some speaker, is plausible: i.e. the hearer thinks that it might 
be true. I will work with a notion of plausibility, rather than truth, when 
I am talking about the transmission of rumours and I will combine it 
with an appeal to trust in order to characterise what I take to be a 
reliable transmission process. Plausibility, as I use it, is a kind of 
coherence notion: a proposition conveyed by a speaker is plausible to 
some hearer when it does not contradict/is not defeated by the hearer’s 
other beliefs. The transmission of a belief between the utterer of a 
rumour and the hearer of said rumour is successful when the hearer 
trusts the speaker and the content of the speaker’s utterance coheres 
with the beliefs of the hearer. 
Let me give an example which contrasts the act of testifying, which 
we normally take to be a reliable process of transmitting propositional 
beliefs, with the act of what I call “rumouring,” the passing on of a 
rumour. 
Amanda and Ewan are discussing office politics. Amanda knows 
that Cindy, their boss, is dating Alice, who was recently fired. Amanda 
is curious to know when Cindy and Alice started dating; was it before 
or after she was dismissed from the workplace?  As Amanda knows 
firsthand that Cindy and Alice are dating, she is able to pass this on to 
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Ewan, who inherits the justified belief that Cindy and Alice are dating 
because Amanda has successfully testified to that fact1. 
Ewan has heard that Cindy and Alice spent an inordinate amount of 
time in Cindy’s bedroom at a party some five months ago so, when 
Amanda tells Ewan that Cindy and Alice started dating, he expresses 
what he has heard about Cindy, Alice, the bedroom and the excessive 
amount of time they spent not engaging in the party all those months 
ago. 
Now, Ewan does not know that this occurred; it is not a justified 
true belief that he holds but merely something he has heard. 
Furthermore, he is not claiming to have any justified belief on this 
matter. Ewan, in this case, is spreading a rumour. This rumour is 
plausible to Ewan because it fits with Ewan’s other beliefs and is not 
inconsistent with Amanda’s testimony, which he has recently come to 
believe. 
I propose that what Ewan is doing here is a textbook case of the 
kind of thing that happens when we engage in rumouring: we express 
what we take to be plausible claims to other members of our 
                                                            
1The definition of testimony I am using comes from Jennifer Lackey’s 
introduction to ‘The Epistemology of Testimony’ (Lackey and Sosa, 
2006), a recent survey volume which I take to be representative of the 
contemporary epistemological views of testimony. Lackey’s definition 
of the act of testifying is as follows: 
 T: S testifies that p by making an act of communication a if 
and only if (in part) in virtue of as communicable content, 
(1) S reasonably intends to convey the information that p, or 
(2) a is reasonably taken as conveying the information that 
p. (Lackey, 2006, p. 3)  
The major debate in the epistemology of testimony is whether, when a 
speaker testifies, the hearer can inherit, by virtue of hearing some piece 
of testimony, a justified true belief. 
If a piece of testimony is to be properly treated as warranted by the 
hearer it must, necessarily, be a justified belief that the speaker holds 
and this belief must not be one that is contrary to the beliefs the hearer 
holds. For the transmission of some piece of testimony to be successful 
the speaker must assert their justified belief and the hearer must trust 
the speaker. If a hearer trusts some speaker and the speaker testifies, 
then the hearer, should they have no defeater belief with respect to the 
piece of testimony, should inherit belief in the proposition; this is the 
trusting transmission of testimony. 
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community, effectively asking them if what we have said coheres with 
what they believe. Rumouring, I believe, is a kind of fact-checking. 
Ewan thinks that his claim about Cindy and Alice is plausible, but 
should Amanda say “No, that can’t be the case; I know that Cindy and 
Errol were an item at the time, and Cindy is a serial monogamist!” then 
Ewan, if he trusts Amanda (say, as a reliable source of information 
about Cindy), should accept that the rumour is no longer plausible 
because it not only fails to cohere with Amanda’s beliefs but it now 
fails to cohere with his beliefs (because, accepting Amanda’s testimony 
to the contrary, Ewan now knows something more about Cindy, 
something that makes his rumour implausible). However, if Amanda 
says “Yes, that makes sense: I saw Cindy and Alice kissing at that 
party five months ago,” then what Ewan has heard will be all the more 
plausible to both Ewan and Amanda (because it now not only coheres 
with Ewan’s other beliefs but it also coheres with those of Amanda). If 
Amanda has nothing to contribute in this matter, then Ewan or Amanda 
might go and ask someone else, to test out the plausibility of the 
rumour. 
2  Rumouring vs. gossiping 
Some people might object to the kind of story I am telling about 
rumouring here by saying something like “Surely what you have 
presented here is a case of gossiping?” because gossiping and 
rumouring might be thought to be the same kind of activity. I disagree, 
and here is why. 
Gossiping is a morally suspicious activity; when you gossip behind 
someone’s back you are asserting, as true, some belief about someone 
that they do not want spread, or would be pleased to know you are 
spreading2. 
                                                            
2Now, you could (and should) ask “Can gossip be rumour and rumour 
gossip?” It is not irrational to think that people are easily confused as to 
whether what they have heard is gossip or rumour. For one thing, 
people are not usually in the habit of expressly marking out whether 
they are gossiping or spreading a rumour. I might just assume that you 
know when I am doing one or the other, or I might inadvertently use 
some ambiguous locution that confuses the issue. For another thing, I 
might deliberately misrepresent some piece of rumour as gossip; I 
overstate my case because the person I am rumour-mongering about, 
say, has done something to irritate me. 
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In my example, Amanda knows that Cindy and Alice are dating but 
she does not know when they started dating. Ewan has only heard that 
they spent an inordinate amount of time in Cindy’s bedroom at a party 
some five months ago but he believes this to be plausible (as it is not 
incoherent with his other beliefs about Cindy and Alice). He is not 
asserting that this is the case; rather, he is expressing what he takes to 
be a plausible belief about Cindy and Alice, and such expressions are 
not cases of gossiping. Gossip occurs when one person transmits what 
they know about someone to another: it is a kind of malicious 
testimony. 
The second reason as to why Ewan is not gossiping is that even if 
Ewan knows that Cindy and Alice spent an inordinate amount of time 
in Cindy’s bedroom at a party some five months ago it is not obvious, 
in this case, that Cindy and Alice would object to him telling Amanda 
about this. Whilst Ewan is, on some level, talking behind the backs of 
Cindy and Alice, there is nothing inherently morally suspicious about 
what he is doing here; perhaps Ewan is too embarrassed to ask Cindy 
and Alice, which is why this conversation is going on without their 
input, or maybe Cindy is not at work today, and so forth. 
This is an important point about rumours; whilst it is always 
morally suspect3 to gossip about someone (because gossiping requires 
you to assert information about someone who does not want said 
information asserted) behind their back, it is not necessarily morally 
suspicious to engage in rumouring. To engage in rumouring, I believe, 
is to engage in a process of assessing whether certain beliefs are 
plausible; it is a kind of fact-checking and whilst sometimes the content 
of such rumours will be material the subjects of said rumour would 
object to being aired, this will not always be the case. Thus, there is 
nothing morally suspicious per se about rumouring, unlike in the case 
of gossiping. 
                                                            
3I say “morally suspect” rather than “morally wrong” because, whilst 
gossiping is a morally suspicious activity, it need not be considered an 
activity which is actually morally wrong. For example: You might not 
like it that I gossiped to a police officer about your larcenous ways 
(thus I act in a morally suspicious manner with respect to our 
friendship) but my reporting on such suspicious behaviour to a relevant 
authority is not itself an example of an prima facie immoral act on my 
part. 
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3  CAJ Coady on rumours 
The philosopher CAJ Coady, in his article ‘Pathologies of Testimony,’ 
contrasts rumours with gossip. He argues that gossip is just a normal 
form of testimony, albeit a type that is restricted to the personal and can 
have malicious character4. Gossip is reliable, according to CAJ Coady, 
because gossip is usually firsthand and is presented as being plausible. 
If you have a piece of gossip, then you have an example of a plausible 
belief that was formed by some immediate experience which you then 
passed on to a hearer like me in a single-step transmission process. If I 
trust you, as the speaker, then I will acquire the belief, the piece of 
gossip, which I will also regard as being plausible. 
One way to see this is with the locution. Gossip, according to CAJ 
Coady, is usually prefaced with “Did you know?” (or some 
synonymous locution). When you gossip you are testifying to that 
belief. If you believe that the testimony-transmission process is 
reliable, then gossip, as a form of testimony, is a reliable source of 
justified beliefs. 
CAJ Coady argues, however, that the transmission of rumours is a 
misfire, or pathology, of the transmission process we associate with 
testimony. He gives two reasons for this verdict: 
 [R]umour can arise from the merest speculation. 
Furthermore, the speaker of rumour will often have no 
competence with regard to the “information” conveyed and 
may well be aware of that. If we think some degree of 
authority or competence, no matter how minimal, is a 
precondition for giving testimony then quite a lot of rumour 
will be disqualified as testimony.5  
Rumours, according to CAJ Coady, are not reliable and this is evident 
in their locution. Rumours are introduced, he argues, with “Have you 
heard?”6 which suggests that the speaker of rumour, unlike the speaker 
                                                            
4Coady, C. A. J. 2006. Pathologies of Testimony. In The Epistemology 
of Testimony, eds. J. Lackey and E. Sosa, pp. 254–62. Oxford 
University Press. 
5Coady, C. A. J. 2006. Pathologies of Testimony. In The Epistemology 
of Testimony, eds. J. Lackey and E. Sosa, p. 265. Oxford University 
Press. 
6Coady, C. A. J. 2006. Pathologies of Testimony. In The Epistemology 
of Testimony, eds. J. Lackey and E. Sosa, p. 262. Oxford University 
Press. 
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of gossip, does not believe the proposition they are expressing is 
plausible7. 
I think presenting rumouring as testifying-gone-wrong is a slight 
mischaracterisation of the act of rumouring. I think that when someone 
says “Have you heard?” they are typically asking whether the rumour 
they have heard is something you, another epistemic agent, can either 
confirm or deny. When you testify, you assert some proposition; you 
convey that you take it to be justified. However, rumourers express 
what they take to be plausible propositions in order to see if others find 
them plausible. When you assert a rumour you are making some claim 
that you have heard something you took to be plausible. As I will 
argue, this process of fact-finding or fact-checking is a reliable one. Its 
reliability is not due to its being like the act of testifying but rather 
because the longer a rumour survives the process of being audited by 
the hearers it is passed on to, the more likely it is to be considered 
plausible. 
That being said, I think that CAJ Coady’s criticism of rumour could 
be based on the locution “Rumour has it…” which I think does signal 
that the speaker is merely transmitting a rumour they have heard 
without necessarily worrying about whether the rumour is plausible. 
The locution “Rumour has it…” I think, carries with it no implication 
that the speaker thinks the belief being conveyed is plausible; it merely 
                                                            
7A recent paper by Margaret A. Cuonzo, ‘Gossip: An Intention-Based 
Account,’ presents a slightly different view of gossip. Cuonzo’s paper 
focuses on the morally suspicious nature of gossiping. She 
characterises the transmission of gossiping thusly: 
 In uttering p, A gossips to B about C if, and only if (i) A 
believes that C would not like A to reveal the information 
contained in p to B; (ii) A would be disinclined to utter p to 
B with C present; (iii) A believes that uttering p will be 
pleasurable to A and/or B; and (iv) p contains information 
about C. (Cuonzo 2008, p. 132)  
Cuonzo’s view of gossip and gossiping deals with the furtive nature of 
gossip; how the speaker of some piece of gossip believes that the 
subject of said gossip would not like the gossip to be disseminated. 
Cuonzo’s account is centered on the beliefs and intentions of the 
speaker of gossip rather than its veristic nature but, in its relevant 
features, provides the same kind of transmission story as that of CAJ 
Coady’s. 
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suggests that the speaker has heard a rumour and is passing it on8. Of 
course, not all rumours are clearly marked and thus some instances of 
someone rumouring in a “Rumour has it…” sense will be taken to be 
instances of “Have you heard…” rumours. 
CAJ Coady is concerned that the speaker of some rumour might 
even embellish their rumour, possibly to make a better story, add some 
detail or simply because they can: this possibility makes it all the less 
likely that the transmission process of rumours can be considered 
reliable9. Now, I think this worry about the embellishment of rumours 
is interesting because I think this drives CAJ Coady’s argument that the 
transmission of rumours is a pathological form of the transmission 
process of testimony. Whilst I think there are concerns that need to be 
addressed with respect to whether rumourers will embellish their 
rumours and what that means for the reliability of the transmission of 
rumours, I will argue that rumouring, as a kind of fact-finding or fact-
checking is a reliable one because the longer a rumour survives being 
audited, the more likely it is to be plausible or even true. 
4  David Coady on rumours 
David Coady, in his article ‘Rumour Has It,’ argues that the 
transmission of rumours is a process that is more reliable than we 
might normally think. He argues: 
 …[M]any rumours are credible (that is, it is rational to 
believe them), and that in general the fact that a proposition 
is rumoured to be true is evidence in favour of it being true.10  
David Coady argues that rumours are expressed in a community of 
speakers and hearers, all of whom are able to check and analyse the 
content of the rumours they hear and, potentially, then pass them on.  
 To begin with, for a communication to be a rumour, it must 
have ‘spread’ through a number of informants (i.e., 
                                                            
8Which might be explicable with respect to certain glosses on the 
etiquette of group communication, et cetera. 
9Coady, C. A. J. 2006. Pathologies of Testimony. In The Epistemology 
of Testimony, eds. J. Lackey and E. Sosa, p. 263. Oxford University 
Press. 
10Coady, D. 2006. Rumour Has It. International Journal of Applied 
Philosophy 20 (1), pp. 41-2. 
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[rumourers]11). …Furthermore, the number of informants 
through which a rumour has spread must be quite large. No 
second-hand account of an event can be a rumour, though it 
may be more of a rumour than a first-hand account. In 
general, the further a rumour has spread, the more fully it 
deserves the name.12  
David Coady thinks that the worry CAJ Coady has about rumours, that 
they will end up being embellished (or in the worst case scenario, be 
total fabrications) is reduced or even eliminated by the checks and 
balances of the transmission process. 
 [A]ll else being equal, the greater the reliability of those 
who spread a rumour, the more likely it is to survive and 
spread. Hence, if you hear a rumour, it is not only prima 
facie evidence that it has been thought plausible by a large 
number of people, it is also prima facie evidence that it has 
been thought plausible by a large number of reliable people. 
And that really is prima facie evidence that it is true.13  
David Coady is arguing that if a rumour survives the checks and 
balances of its transmission process, then it is because at least some 
hearers in the community will be interested in either confirming or 
denying the rumours they hear and that this is a prima facie reason to 
think the rumour true. 
The process of checks and balances in the process of rumouring 
assumes mutual trust: I, as a rumourer, express a rumour to you. You 
trust me to express it sincerely and I trust you to either confirm or deny 
the rumour (or, at the very least, say whether you think it coheres with 
respect to your other beliefs). 
If we take our community of agents to consist of mostly trustworthy 
speakers, then, I argue, it is the plausibility of a given rumour that we 
should be concerned with. As a rumour spreads, the plausibility of it to 
the community of speakers and hearers as a whole will take on more 
and more importance. A single hearer might well find that the belief 
coheres with her other beliefs, but that hearer might be anomalous. 
                                                            
11David Coady uses word “rumour-monger” rather than “rumourer” but 
I have reserved that term to describe something different, as will 
become apparent later in the paper. 
12Coady, D. 2006. Rumour Has It. International Journal of Applied 
Philosophy 20 (1), p. 42. 
13Coady, D. 2006. Rumour Has It. International Journal of Applied 
Philosophy 20 (1), p. 47. 
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They may not be normal, with respect to the group, in the beliefs that 
they hold. As the rumour spreads further through the community, 
however, it will be checked and analysed by more and more hearers 
and, should it not cohere with their beliefs, it is likely to stop being 
transmitted14. 
So, with respect to David Coady’s thesis about the likely truth of a 
rumour as it spreads further and further in a community, I say, given 
my coherence notion of plausibility, that if a rumour spreads widely 
through a community without encountering defeater beliefs, then such 
a rumour could be considered to be superbly plausible to the 
community as a whole. As a rumour spreads it will inevitably 
encounter more in the way of interested hearers who will not pass on 
the proposition unless it is considered plausible, which is to say it 
coheres with their own beliefs. 
This is not to say that belief in rumours is always warranted, 
because the activity of what I will call “rumour-mongering” represents 
a pathology of the normally reliable transmission process of rumours. 
However, I will argue that there is a case to be made that belief in the 
substance of particular rumours is generally warranted, all things being 
equal. 
5  Rumouring vs. rumour-mongering 
The normal and, I claim, typically reliable transmission of rumours, 
rumouring, can be contrasted with rumour-mongering, which is the 
pathology of rumouring. Rumouring, as I have argued, is typically a 
kind of fact-finding: we hear something, think it sounds plausible and 
then spread it on to someone else in the hope that they will confirm it, 
deny it, or pass it on so it can be confirmed or denied by someone else. 
Rumour-mongering, however, is not a fact-finding activity but rather 
the mere spreading of a rumour. I say “mere” here because, unlike 
typical rumouring, which, when all goes well, is the trustworthy 
transmission of plausible beliefs between speakers and hearers, 
                                                            
14This is an empirical claim but one that I think is likely to be true. This 
is a line that Cass Sunstein runs in his book “On Rumours” (Sunstein 
2009, p. 21). Sunstein argues that a rumour can be countered by a 
defeater belief. As long as the hearer of some piece of rumour trusts the 
source of the defeater belief and the hearer does not have a strong 
commitment to the truth of the rumour, then the presence of a defeater 
belief should stop the transmission of a rumour from a speaker to a 
hearer (Sunstein 2009, p. 53-4). 
11 
rumour-mongering can result in the acquisition, by the hearer, of a 
belief in a rumour, even when the speaker regards it as implausible. 
Now, it is true that many rumour-mongers have an interest in 
whether the rumours they are spreading are plausible. I might, for 
example, want to believe Cindy and Alice are engaging in an office 
affair because that belief pleases me, or because Cindy rejected my 
advances and thus Alice, who I hate and detest, is the kind of person I 
now think Cindy deserves (because I am ill-disposed towards her). 
However, the act of rumour-mongering can bring with it the act of 
embellishing upon a rumour, and I think that this could be the 
pathology of the transmission process that CAJ Coady is concerned 
about. Consider these two related worries about rumour-mongers and 
rumour-mongering. 
The first worry is that rumour-mongers, because they are not 
sincere in their utterances, might get mistaken for being rumourers. The 
hearer might believe that the proposition they have just heard is one the 
speaker believed. If influential organisations engage in rumour-
mongering, especially in situations where there is no official (and 
warranted) information available, then this is a serious problem as it 
could lead to the dissemination of disinformation. 
The second worry about rumour-mongering is that hearers will not 
necessarily know if the rumour they find to be plausible has been 
embellished, been tailored to be plausible to the hearer or so forth. If 
we assume (for the sake of argument) that most people express rumours 
without embellishments, et cetera, then the fact that some people might 
not just embellish but even wholly fabricate the rumours they spread, 
can lead to what is otherwise a generally reliable transmission process 
being perverted. Indeed, some charges of disinformation focus on how 
“those who are in power” spread tailored or fabricated rumours, which 
appear plausible, to the general populace in order to make certain 
conspiracy theories appear unwarranted. 
This may explain part of the story as to why conspiracy theories 
and rumours are often confused; some of the evidence used to make the 
explanatory hypothesis of either an official theory or a conspiracy 
theory may be the result of rumour-mongering. Arguably, a lot of the 
evidence cited by 9/11 Truthers consists of rumours which have been 
mongered, just as a lot of the evidence that was said to warrant the 
official theory that there were weapons of mass destruction being 
developed by the Hussein regime in Iraq was mongered as well. 
Now, presumably embellished or totally fabricated rumours should 
not spread far because of the checks and balances of the community of 
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speakers and hearers, but mongered rumours might persist in some 
cases. 
For example, although Herriman does not explicitly argue for this 
thesis, in his article “The Great Rumor Mill: Gossip, Mass Media, and 
the Ninja Fear” he suggests that some rumour-mongered beliefs will 
survive in a community. Herriman is concerned that such mongered 
rumours, when they are part of an official theory or are put forward by 
what are taken to be, by hearers, influential institutions, like 
newspapers, might be considered plausible because they fit in with 
what the hearers in that community are meant to believe15 16. 
Rumour-mongering, I think, shows that the normally reliable 
transmission process of rumours can be perverted. Now, the extent of 
this problem is really more a topic for sociologists, anthropologists and 
psychologists and the like, who are better placed to tell us just how 
often people embellish or even fabricate rumours. Still, both the 
embellishment of rumours and the possibility that a speaker might 
spread rumours for the sake of spreading rumours are, I think, problems 
for my account of the generally reliable nature of the transmission of 
rumours. 
Let us return to Ewan and his rumour. 
Ewan has heard that Cindy and Alice spent an inordinate amount of 
time in Cindy’s bedroom at a party five months ago. He then 
remembers that at an office party some five months ago he saw them in 
what can only be called a “compromising position” and infers that it is 
this particular party people have been talking about. He then starts a 
new rumour; he has heard that Cindy and Alice were already in a 
relationship five months ago. This is a kind of embellishment because 
Ewan is now adding content to the rumour. This move seems relatively 
unproblematic because Ewan’s embellishment is simply a plausible 
addition as it is something that is consistent with the original rumour 
                                                            
15 Herriman, N. (2010). The great rumor mill: Gossip, mass media, and 
the ninja fear. The Journal of Asian Studies, 69(3), p. 739. 
16Sunstein’s full model of rumour transmission, as expressed in ‘On 
Rumours,’ is an example of what he calls a “social cascade.” He has it 
that hearers will ignore defeater beliefs with regard to a certain rumour 
if most of their peers find the rumour plausible (Sunstein 2009, p. 22). 
Sunstein’s argument seems to be that there are social as well as 
epistemic reasons which bear on the plausibility of rumours to hearers 
and that the pressure to conform to the beliefs of your peers will often 
trump epistemic reasons to consider a given rumour as implausible. 
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and may even confirm it. Ewan is not lying, although maybe he should, 
in this case, sign-post his addition to the rumour. 
Now, if David Coady is right, then this embellishment of the 
rumour will end up being checked by those who hear it. If Amanda 
says “No, that can’t be right; Alice and Jo started dating at that party,” 
then Ewan’s embellished rumour should not spread any further. If, 
however, Amanda goes “Hold on, now I think about it, I remember 
Cindy and Alice sharing a taxi after the party,” then Ewan’s 
embellished rumour may well end up spreading further because it 
coheres all the more with Amanda’s beliefs about Cindy and Alice and 
now seems all the more plausible. This again suggests that plausibility 
is a key feature of rumours: an implausible rumour, one that does not 
cohere with the hearers’ beliefs, is unlikely to spread far17. 
The transmission of plausible propositions by trustworthy speakers, 
which seems to be what we have in the case of rumouring, should show 
us that the transmission of rumours is, by and large, reliable, and thus 
we have a case for treating rumours as prima facie warranted beliefs. 
The fact that we have to put up with some (perhaps even a lot of) 
elaboration and embellishment of rumours by rumour-mongers, just as 
we put up with the embellishments of historians, both written and oral, 
in our histories is the price we should be willing to pay for a generally 
reliable process. 
                                                            
17The social media service that is Twitter (a micro-blogging platform) is 
a good example of how such a process works. Given the short nature of 
tweets, many messages on Twitter are either a URL or a quote with a 
corresponding request for confirmation of the content of said quote. If 
the quote or the content of the URL is plausible, the message will be 
retweeted by another Twitter user and if the content of the quote or the 
URL is not plausible it will either not be retweeted or the respondent 
will reply to the tweet with either a correction or a denial. Indeed, the 
rumour that President Obama was to announce the assassination of 
Osama bin Laden started spreading on Twitter almost an hour before 
the White House Press Conference on the 30th of April, 2011CE, and 
the rumour, which became remarkably detailed in the minutes before 
the official announcement, was accurate; the rumour was plausible 
because it cohered with other information people had heard and no 
defeaters were presented during its spread. (Stelter 2011) 
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6  Rumours and conspiracy theories 
The claim that conspiracy theories can be rumours is an interesting and 
recurring issue in the literature. Cass Sunstein, in his recent book on 
rumours, for example, is of the opinion that conspiracy theories are 
spread by rumouring 18 but I think it is important to distinguish 
carefully between conspiracy theories and rumours, so that even if 
someone does not accept my argument about the reliability of rumours, 
they can still accept my argument that the transmission process 
associated with conspiracy theories is importantly different to that of 
rumours. 
In ‘Rumour Has It,’ David Coady draws an analogy between the 
lack of officialness of rumours and a similar lack of officialness with 
respect to conspiracy theories as a reason for finding rumours and 
conspiracy theories suspicious. He argues that if a rumour is confirmed 
by some appropriate official source, then it will lose the status of being 
a rumour and that, in the same way, if a conspiracy theory is confirmed 
by some appropriate official source, then it loses the status of being a 
conspiracy theory. 
His thesis on the unofficial nature of rumours is as follows: 
 [R]umours are essentially unofficial things. No public 
statement by a government or a government agency, for 
example, no matter how far removed it was from an original 
eyewitness account, could be a rumour (though, of course, it 
could confirm a pre-existing rumour or be responsible for 
starting another rumour).19  
This is a thesis which applies to conspiracy theories, as well. 
 No official account of an event, no matter how 
conspiratorial it is, is likely to be characterised as a 
conspiracy theory. Both rumours and conspiracy theories 
seem by definition to lack official status.20  
Now, I agree that one of the reasons why we are often thought to be 
justified in our suspicion of conspiracy theories is because they lack a 
certain authority, to wit, official status. In the same respect one of the 
                                                            
18Sunstein, C. R. (2009). On Rumours. New York. Farrar, Strauss and 
Girous, p. 7. 
19Coady, D. 2006. Rumour Has It. International Journal of Applied 
Philosophy 20 (1), p. 48. 
20Coady, D. 2006. Rumour Has It. International Journal of Applied 
Philosophy 20 (1), p. 48. 
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reasons why we might find rumours suspicious is that they, too, lack 
authority. 
Here is an example. 
Amelia and Steffi are talking in the cafeteria. Both are concerned 
about the reasons behind the invasion of Iraq by the United States of 
America. Amelia is a conspiracy theorist with respect to this issue. She 
firmly believes that the official theory about the invasion, that the 
American Government claimed that the Saddam Hussein-led regime in 
Iraq was developing Weapons of Mass Destruction, was not just a lie 
but that the real reason for the invasion of Iraq was that America 
secretly wanted to take control of the region’s oil reserves. Amelia is 
asserting a conspiratorial explanation for the invasion of Iraq by 
American forces and is, thus, asserting a conspiracy theory. 
Steffi, on the other hand, believes that the Government of the 
United States of America did mistakenly believe that the Iraqi 
Government was developing Weapons of Mass Destruction (and thus 
she denies one of the conspiracy theories of the event). She has also 
heard that a motivating factor for the invasion was that in addition to 
bringing down a Government which was developing WMDs it would 
also help America to take a controlling interest in the region’s oil 
reserves, a proposition which she expresses to Amelia. Steffi is 
spreading a rumour. 
Amelia believes that her conspiracy theory is the actual explanation 
for America’s invasion of Iraq; she is asserting that it is the case. Steffi, 
however, is simply spreading a rumour. She is not asserting that her 
story is true but rather passing on something she has heard and found 
plausible. Should someone confirm Steffi’s rumour with reference to 
some appropriately official source (say, leaked war documents), then 
not only would that make Steffi’s rumour all the more plausible, it 
might, in fact, stop any of her further communication of this 
information from being a rumour because she could, now, testify that it 
is the case. 
I think it is reasonable to say that rumours lack any form of official 
status. If a rumour had been endorsed by an appropriate authority, then 
it would not be a rumour21. 
                                                            
21David Coady’s argument about rumours and official status is sound, 
provided that we appeal to an appropriate authority; if a rumour is 
endorsed by an epistemically suitable official source or influential 
institution, then the rumour will become a proposition which we are 
justified in believing. However, if the rumour is endorsed by an 
inappropriate authority, i.e. someone who lacks the right kind of 
16 
However, part of the the so-called “common sense suspicion” about 
the prima facie unwarranted nature of conspiracy theories is precisely 
that they lack a certain authority, to wit, they have no official status. 
Now, it is true that our suspicion of conspiracy theories is often 
based upon comparing them to their rivals, which are sometimes going 
to be official theories. In a case where we have an official theory, 
where we have a theory which has been endorsed, we might be tempted 
to consider the official theory to be the better explanation because the 
endorsement inherent in its official status implies that there is an appeal 
to authority that underpins the rival to the conspiracy theory. If this is 
the argument, then the lack of official status is a factor in the common 
sense suspicion of conspiracy theories but this common sense suspicion 
is wrong: unless we know that the appeal to authority is legitimate, then 
a theory having official status tells us nothing about whether belief in it 
is warranted or unwarranted22. 
                                                                                                                                             
credentials with respect to the content of the rumour, then it is not clear 
what that does to the status of the rumour. 
This is a point I think Nicholas Herriman makes in his article ‘The 
Great Rumor Mill: Gossip, Mass Media, and the Ninja Fear,’ which is 
that a rumour can be treated as having been officially endorsed, and 
thus plausible, when influential media institutions report it as fact. 
 Nils Bubandt (2008) demonstrates that in North Maluku in 
1999–2000, leaflets that contained oral rumors circulated. 
The information–conspiracy theories about Christian or 
Muslim “enemies”–was already hearsay, but gained 
authority through being written in the leaflets, and was a 
trigger for communal violence. (Herriman 2010, p. 726)  
This kind of endorsement, I think, amounts to endorsing rumour-
mongering, as the rumour has not been assessed to see whether it is 
plausible but rather it is treated as being newsworthy and is transmitted 
on to hearers via a medium which (perhaps mistakenly) many hearers 
think is trustworthy. David Coady makes a similar point: in the right 
kind of society rumours might be considered more reliable than official 
information (Coady 2006b, p. 48-9). 
22Indeed, if this is a problem for conspiracy theories, then it is equally a 
problem for official theories, because, arguably, we need to be able to 
assess how much trust to place in the sources of official theories before 
we can say that they trump their rivals. 
Neil Levy, in his 2007 paper, ‘Radically Socialized Knowledge and 
Conspiracy Theories,’ (Levy, 2007) takes it that official theories are 
17 
Yet, in the same way that the availability of an official theory could 
be said to provide a reason to doubt a conspiracy theory, a conspiracy 
theory could provide a good reason to doubt some official theory. 
Certainly, within certain communities conspiracy theories spread 
rapidly and widely and I would hazard that this is because the content 
of the conspiracy theory coheres well with the pre-existing beliefs of 
that group. This suggests that we can be easily fooled into accepting 
some proposition because of its plausibility, or coherence with our 
other beliefs.  
I think we can say that one of the reasons why conspiracy theories 
seem to spread regardless of their low relative plausibility (in 
comparison to rival explanations) is that if the conspiracy theory 
coheres with some hearer’s existing beliefs they might be less likely to 
appraise the trustworthiness of the speaker. Nevertheless, this is not a 
problem with conspiracy theories per se but rather with the psychology 
of certain conspiracy theorists. 
We need to be able to appraise the trustworthiness of official 
sources before we can claim that official theories can trump conspiracy 
theories. This is precisely what some people, often labelled “conspiracy 
theorists” pejoratively, are concerned with when they downplay the 
institutional endorsement of official theories, I think, there is a perverse 
plausibility to this move. If you think “they” are out to get you, then 
you should expect that they will endorse false theories expecting the 
public to treat such an endorsement as a reason to think the theory has 
the right credentials. 
                                                                                                                                             
truth-conducive because they are transmitted between individuals and 
if the official theoryconsidered plausible, then it must have been 
produced and preserved in an epistemically appropriate way (Levy 
2007, p. 182). Levy’s argument is that if official theories survive in 
what we might call the “marketplace of ideas” (a term Cass Sunstein, 
the Administrator of the White House Office of Information and 
Regulatory Affairs, has used in his book, “On Rumours,” a work which 
links rumours to conspiracy theories (Sunstein 2009)), it is because 
they are not just endorsed by official sources but also transmitted in a 
trusting fashion between speakers and hearers. 
The problem with official theories is that whilst they might well 
spread from speakers to hearers such official sources are not 
necessarily going to be epistemically authoritative and may be an 
influential institution which is merely political in nature. In cases like 
this, we need to ask questions about whether we have a case for 
trusting the utterances of said institution. 
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Whilst rumours, like conspiracy theories, lack official status this is 
not because rumours are denied by, or are in opposition to, some 
influential institution or authority but simply because rumouring is a 
case of finding out what is the most plausible thing to believe (often 
without asking the authorities directly) 
Recall the example of Amelia and Steffi and the real reason behind 
the invasion of Iraq. Amelia asserted a conspiracy theory to explain the 
invasion whilst Steffi expressed a rumour about why the invasion 
occurred. Conspiracy theorists regard the theories they assert as the 
most plausible explanation of the event; if there is a rival explanation to 
the conspiracy theories, then we need to assess both said rival (say, an 
official theory) and what this means for belief in the conspiracy 
theories. 
This difference is crucial to understanding why we should not 
conflate the spreading of rumours with the spreading of conspiracy 
theories; rumours are merely mentioned and conspiracy theories are 
proposed as the explanation. What makes the transmission process of 
rumouring a reliable one is that when a speaker transmits a rumour to a 
hearer we do not require the speaker or the hearer to believe the rumour 
is true, we only require that the hearer finds it plausible, which is to say 
it coheres with her other beliefs. Thus, when a speaker engages in 
rumouring and transmits a rumour to a hearer, the speaker should be 
prepared for the possibility that the rumour will be considered 
implausible by the hearer; a defeater belief might be asserted which 
shows that the rumour is implausible. This should not be a problem for 
rumourers or the process of rumouring as it is a process of fact-finding 
or fact-checking. A rumourer should not stand by their proposition if it 
is defeated or becomes implausible to them. Defeater propositions, 
which show that the rumour is implausible, will be something, 
presumably, the rumourer should want to know. Indeed, the existence 
of a rival hypothesis with respect to a rumour may even be considered a 
good thing if it helps the rumourer to find out what is really going on. 
Conspiracy theorists, however, will normally assert their conspiracy 
theories: the conspiracy theory presented by the conspiracy theorist is 
what they consider to be the best explanation of the event23 24. 
                                                            
23As a purely psychological point, some conspiracy theorists are 
unlikely to be easily dissuaded that their explanation is incorrect just 
because some hearer finds it implausible, especially if the conspiracy 
theorist has questions about whether the defeater propositions 
presented by said hearer in response to a conspiracy theorybased in 
19 
Whereas the reliability of the transmission process of rumours is 
based the plausibility of the rumoured proposition to the hearer (and 
trusting that speakers will not embellish or fabricate rumours) the 
transmission of conspiracy theories is reliable only when the speaker 
and the hearer are in a trusting relationship with one another such that 
the hearer inherits the asserted belief of the hearer. 
Now, most people will say that this makes the transmission of 
conspiracy theories seem like it is a reliable process and thus prone to 
producing justified beliefs. However, our common sense suspicion 
about conspiracy theories has it that they are examples of unwarranted 
beliefs, so surely there must be something wrong with my analysis 
because it goes against a view most of us regard as very plausible. 
My response is that a transmission process is only as good as its 
inputs. If a speaker has a justified belief that a conspiracy existed and 
they pass that on successfully, then the hearer will also form a justified 
                                                                                                                                             
what the conspiracy theorist considers to be disinformation or an 
appeal to an official theory. 
24There is an obvious objection to my thesis that the spreading of 
rumours and conspiracy theories is importantly dissimilar, which goes 
like this: 
 Theorising about conspiracies is surely also a form of fact-
finding, just like rumouring. It is an activity undertaken by 
an agent who wants to find the best explanation for an event.  
I agree; theorising about conspiracies can be a kind of fact-finding but 
it is a different kind of activity to that of the spreading of conspiracy 
theories. The relationship between conspiracy theories and conspiracy 
theorising is not analogous to the relationship between rumours and 
rumouring. Rumouring is a kind of fact-finding, a fishing for 
information based upon agents testing propositions against what else 
they know, promoting plausible beliefs and rejecting implausible ones. 
Theorising about conspiracies might be similar (in that it is an activity 
where you seek to answer the question of whether some event could 
have occurred because of the existence of a conspiracy), but the 
spreading of conspiracy theories is not, typically, a fact-finding 
exercise because conspiracy theories are proposed as the explanation of 
an event. This is why the reliable transmission of conspiracy theories 
does not merely require that we trust speakers, but it also requires that 
the speaker have a justified belief that some conspiracy theory is the 
explanation of the event in question. This task is not impossible but it 
may well be difficult in many cases. 
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belief about said conspiracy. The question, then, is whether the 
speaker’s belief in the existence of a conspiracy was itself warranted?  
I think the answer to this question depends, in part, on whether 
conspiracy theories, as explanations, are formed in the right way. When 
it comes to assessing the transmission of a conspiracy theory for its 
reliability it is not sufficient to merely say that if a hearer trusts the 
speaker of some conspiracy theory, then the hearer is justified in taking 
onboard belief in said conspiracy theory because we might trust a 
conspiracy theorist to be sincere in their assertion but not trust that they 
have arrived at their belief in an orthodox manner. We need to look at 
the inference to the existence of a conspiracy, which underpins the 
conspiracy theory itself, and ask whether the conspiracy theorist who 
originally proposed the conspiracy theory inferred to the best 
explanation out of the range of plausible candidate hypotheses rather 
than just engaged in inferring to any old explanation. 
We might be tempted to think that a conspiracy theory must do a lot 
of work to be considered warranted. Conspiracy theories must not only 
be transmitted in a trusting fashion but they must also be the best 
possible explanation (of a range of candidate explanations). The 
existence of competing explanatory hypotheses, as rivals to some 
conspiracy theory (or set of conspiracy theories), indicates that the 
conspiracy theory is controversial and thus must be backed up with an 
argument as to why the inference to the existence of a conspiracy, in 
this case, is the best explanation. 
7  Conclusion 
I have compared and contrasted the transmission processes of rumours 
and conspiracy theories, which are sometimes considered to be 
unwarranted for the same reasons. I argued that we should not confuse 
the issue of the reliability of rumours with that of the reliability of 
conspiracy theories because they typically have different transmission 
processes.  
Rumouring is, typically, a form of fact-finding or checking, where 
propositions we have heard stated are tested against the beliefs of 
others. I argued that, when it comes to appraising rumours, what is 
important is whether the hearer trusts the rumourer to be sincere and 
finds the content of the rumoured proposition plausible. If a rumour is 
implausible it is unlikely to spread far in the community of speakers 
and hearers because hearers, presumably, are interested in auditing the 
propositions which spread through their community. If a rumour is 
plausible to some hearer, then the hearer may well go and test the 
21 
rumour out on some other hearer to see whether it is coherent with their 
beliefs. It is this set of conditions about the testing, or teasing out, of 
the plausibility of rumours that leads me to think that rumouring is a 
reliable process. 
The activity of rumour-mongering, the insincere and pathological 
counterpart of rumouring, explains why we might think of rumouring 
as an unreliable process. An agent who engages in rumour-mongering 
may well embellish or even fabricate the rumours they spread. 
Rumour-mongering is an abuse of trust because rumour-mongering is 
the insincere transmission of a rumour. Now, the process of auditing, 
the checks and balances of the transmission process of rumours will, I 
argue, mean that embellished and fabricated rumours will typically end 
up being implausible to hearers but, in some cases, such rumours may 
well persist in a community. This is a bullet we have to bite when it 
comes to the transmission of rumours: the reliability of the process 
means we cannot guarantee that all rumours will be plausible. 
I also argued that the transmission process associated with 
conspiracy theories can be reliable but that there is an important 
difference between rumouring and the spreading of conspiracy theories. 
Conspiracy theories are asserted, rather than merely mentioned, as the 
explanation of an event. The conspiracy theorist does not merely 
believe their conspiracy theory is plausible, they believe it to be the 
explanation. It is in this way that rumours and conspiracy theories are 
different. 
Or, at least, that’s what I’ve heard. Rumour has it that people who 
say otherwise are conspiracy theorists. 
22 
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